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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

I
\1

RANDY DIMMITT,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

MAURICE C. JONES and J. PAT- /
TON NEELEY, Judges of the City )
Court of Salt Lake City; and the
CITY COURT OF SALT LAKE
CITY
' Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
11137

RESPONDENTS' .BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
'l'he appellant filed a petition for Writ of Prohibition against the above named judges and City Court
of Salt Lake City to enjoin that court from hearing a
case involving traffic violations charged against the
appellant juvenile. The appellant contends that the
1
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juveni~e courts of this state have exclusive jurisdiction

I

over. him by virtue of the Juvenile Act of 1965, Afttr
hearmg arguments of both sides, the Honorable Br\'aui
II. Croft, Judge in the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, held that defendant :
court had concurrent j1-1 risdiction over juveniles wit11
were charged with traffic violations and dismissed ap
pellant's request for Writ of Prohibition.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent is substantially in agreement with ilit
statement of facts as listed in appellant's brief.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

'

I

THE JUVENILE COUHT IS A SPECIAL
COURT AND ITS JURISDICTION MUST EE
STRICTLY CONSTRUED.
As stated in 20 Am. J ur. 2d Courts, Section :11.
juwnile courts are special courts. The jurisdiction o:
special courts must be expressly stated in the Jegislatirt
enactment inasmuch as they carve out their jurisdictio:i
from courts of general jurisdiction. Therefore, in \n,
case presently before the court, if there is any duLlf
as to the power of the juvenile court over the person:':' 1
offenses, this doubt must be resolved in favor of afino j

2
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.

l

ing of concurring jurisdiction by courts of general
jurisdiction. Anderson vs. Anderson, 18 Utah 2d 89,
416 P2d. 308 ( 1966).

POINT II
THE CITY COURT HAS CONCURRENT
JURISDICTION OVER TRAFFIC OFFENDERS \VHO ARE UNDER THE AGE OF 18.
The Juvenile Court Law of 1965 gave jurisdiction
to the juvenile court over minors under the age of 18
who violated local or city ordinances. The respondents,
in these proceedings, contend that the city courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile courts over
traffic offenders who are under the age of 18. A close
reading of the Juvenile Court Law presently in effect
in this state will readily impress the reader that traffic
offenders are treated completely different from those
inrnlved in any other violation. The traffic offender is,
in fact, convicted of a crime by the juvenile court, while
other violations are treated as civil matters and the
court invokes equity in handling those matters, (section
55-10-105) U.C.A. 1953 It is clear that the procedures
covering traffic cases in the Juvenile Code are entirely
different from all other alleged violations, (section 5510-96). A traffic violation is the only alleged offense to
which a petition need not be filed to commence the action (section 55-10-83 ( 3) ) . The records of a traffic violation are the only records that may be used in any other

3
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court as evidence against the juvenile in his later life
(section 55-10-105 ( 2) ) , and the same records may t;
filed with the State Department of Public Safety and
used by them as a basis for the suspension of a driver')
license, (section 55-10-105 ( 5) ) . The reasonable conclu.
sion from these numerous exceptions covering traffic
violations is that the Legislature intended the city court
to have concurrent jurisdiction in prosecution of minor)
under its traffic code. It is apparent from section 5j.
10-105, U.C.A. as amended, that the Legisature did
not, in fact, intend that the juvenile court should have
exclusive jurisdiction over traffic offenders under the
age of 18. We quote said section:

'
1

!

:

1

I

i
1

I

I

"55-10-105. Children's cases deemed civil pro·
ceedings-Adjudication of jurisdiction by juvenile court not conviction of crime, exception Record and evidence inadmissible in other pro·
ceedings, exception-Child not to be charged
with crime, exception-Traffic violation cases, I
abstracts to department of public safety.-(11
Proceedings in children's cases shall be rega:~ed ,
as civil proceedings, with the court exerc1smg
equitable powers.
"(2) An adjudication by a juvenile court t~at
a child is within its jurisdiction under section
55-10-77 shall not be deemed a conviction of
a crime, except in cases involving traffic vi~la·
tions · no such adjudication shall operate to llJ1·
pose 'any civil disabilities up~n. the c~ild nor. 1.'.
disqualify the child for any civil service or mill i
tary service or appointment.
I
.
d
.
h
·
·1
court
" ( 3) Neither the recor m. t e J.uvem e hl
nor any evidence given in the JUvemle courts a
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I!
I
I

I

be admissible as evidence against the child in any
other court, with the exception of cases involving
traffic violations.

'I

, I
I

I:

I

I

'
'\

., I:

1
)

I

a,

1•

1·

tn

J..

rt

ill
I
I

I

" ( 4) No child shall be charged with crime nor
be convicted in any court except as provided in
section 55-10-86 and in cases involving 'traffic
violations. When a petition has been filed in the
juvenile court, the child shall not thereafter be
subjected to criminal prosecution based on t.b.e
same facts except as provided in section 55-10-86.
" ( 5) Abstracts of court records for adjudications of traffic violations shall be submitted to
the department of public safety as provided in
sections 41-2-17, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended 'by chapter 84, Laws of Utah 1961."

Subsection I of the above requires that all proceedings
will be civil proceedings with the court exercising equitable powers. Subsection 2 provides that an adjudication
by the juvenile court is not a crime, except In cases
involving traffic violations. Subsection 3 excepts traffic
violations from the effect of its provisions. Subsection
4 certainly establishes by express language that no
child may be charged with or convicted of a crime
in any other court except in two areas : ( 1) where
the juvenile is charged with the commission of a felony
and the juvenile court certifies that child to the district
court to be treated as an adult and tried under the
Code of Criminal Procedures; and (2) in cases involving traffic violations.
The first sentence of subsection 4 reads "no child
shall be charged with crime nor be convicted in any
court except as provided in section 55-10-86 and in
5
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cases involving traffic violations." If the Legislature
intended the act to read as appellant contends, lht
above phrase in any court would have been eliminated.
By the use of the phrase in any court the Legislature
intended that other courts have concurrent power tu
try juvenile traffic violators.
The secend sentence of subsection 4 sets up the
ground rules as between courts of general jurisdiction
and the juvenile court involving traffic violations a5
to which court shall handle the matter if filed in both.
It could not apply to alleged violations of felonies or II
juveniles as the procedures covering those matters are
dictated by section 86. When the petition or matter
has been filed in the juvenile court, then that court
processes the matter to its conclusion and the defendanl
is not burdened with also having to appear before an·
other court in the case. Inasmuch as all other violatiom
of local ordinances or state laws committed by a minor
must be filed in the juvenile court, the legislative com·
mand as found in subsection 4 is without meaning unless
respondent's contention of concurrent jurisdiction ~
accepted as to traffic violations.

I
I
I

This court has on many occasions adhered. to '.n1
general rule of statutory construction that a leg1slatire
001
enactment be literally construed. We quote from
of the most recent:
.
"The enactment of the statute prescribini
this procedure is the legislative prer~g~tive.J'~I
1
carries with it the presumptions that it is va 0
and that the words and phrases were chosen a·

6
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I'

visely to express the legislative intent. The
statute should not be stricken down nor applied
other than in accordance with its literal wording

unless it is so unclear or confused as to be wholly
beyond reason, or inoperable, or it contravenes
some basic constitutional right." (emphasis added) Gord vs. Salt Lake City, .... Utah.2d .... ,
434 P.2d 449, (1967.)
To accept plaintiff's position would be to totally ignore
the above rule as it applies to subsection 4. The phrase
" in any court" and the instructions in the second
sentence when literally construed and applied can lead
to no other conclusion and procedure than that advocated by respondents, that other courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over minors charged with traffic violations.
It has been argued by appellants that section 5510-79 requires a judge of all other courts to refer all
defendants under the age of 18 to the juvenile court.

One must realize that this requirement is dependent
upon the juvenile court having exclusive jurisdiction
orer the alleged offense. In the case before us, an exception to that exclusive jurisdiction has been carved out
by section 55-10-105, subsection 4.
It is not the position of respondents in this case
that city courts have jurisdiction over juveniles charged
with a misdemeanor in matters other than those involving traffic violations. The specific argument being that
the Legislature exempted this one area from the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

7
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POINT III
THE EXPRESSED INTENTION 01•' THE
LEGISLATURE IN ENACTING THE 19oj
JUVENILE ACT WAS TO PROVIDE PRO.
TECTION AND ASSISTANCE FOR THl
NEGLECTED AND ANTI-SOCIAL JU\'E.
NILE NOT THE TRAFFIC ~F~:ENDER
I

Quotn1g from section 55-10-63, it is the purpose I
of this act to secure for each child coming before tne
juvenile court . . . guidance and discipline require~
to assist him to develop into a responsible citizen, to
improve the condition and home environment respon·
sible for his delinquency; and, at the same time to pro·
tect the community and those individual citizens from
juvenile violence and juvenile law breaking." Tht
normal traffic offender, be he an adult or minor, it
not normally rebelling against society and exhibitini
violence and intentional law breaking. These violatiom
generally result from negligence in the operation oi
the vehicle. This, respondents are sure, was realized h~·
the State Legislature and is the purpose behind the
numerous exceptions written into the law concernin1
traffic violations. This court in considering the juri)·
diction and purpose of the juvenile court found a)
follows:
"Section 77 deals with the authority of ~fie 1
juvenile court to act in proceedings concernm; i
children who are neglected, dependent, o~ v.h ;
for reasons pertaining to anti-social behav1~r ~'. !
family status require investigation and a~u~a I
cation." Anderson vs. Anderson, 18 Uta · :
89, 416 P.2d 308.

8
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Respondents admit that there are certain drivers
who are grossly irresponsible toward society and in
the case of minor drivers so situated, it is entirely proper
that they be treated in a different manner than the
regular responsible operator of a motor vehicle. This
is one of the reasons that the Legislature included
traffic violations within the Juvenile Court Code. It
is completely within the common understanding of
traffic court judges, town magistrates, and justices of
the peace that should these special violators come before
the court, they may be referred to the juvenile court
' for assistance and rehabilitation.

1

The privilege to drive is granted by the State to
members of society who have reached a certain level of
ability to operate a motor vehicle. There is no right
to this license for this privilege must be earned by proof
of performance and will be continued in effect only so
long as the licensed operator stays within the framework of the rules and regulations pertaining to the
operation of a motor vehicle. The minor under the age
of 18 is no differently situated when operating a motor
rehicle than is an adult, be he 21 or 91, and justice
would demand that he be treated in exactly the same
manner as his elder counterpart. As indicated in
Anderson vs. Anderson, supra, the purpose of the
jurenile act is to assist those minors who are neglected
or who show anti-social behavior. To consider exceeding the speed limit by five miles an hour or committing
some other common violation to be exhibiting antisocial behavior is absurd.

9
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It is recognized by respondents that a contin I
ua, I
showing by a minor of disregard for traffic laws wou]~
indicate that that minor was neglected or showing anti.
social behavior and, therefore, would need additional.
help and counseling. The same principle is realized 01 !
the traffic courts of this state in cases concerning aduit1 l
where constar1t violators are required to attend special
classes which attempt to teach them the responsibilitr
required of the driver and the proper operation of~
motor vehicle.
I
1

'j

It is for the above reasons that the Legislature'
established concurrent jurisdiction in the city courb !
and the juvenile courts for the handling of traffic rio·
lators under the age of 18. The respondent court, ana
its associated traffic violation bureau, by computer.
keep records of all traffic violations. The driver license
1
division of the State of Utah maintains a file on eacn
driver licensed by the State and a record of all traffic
violations for quick reference. In the respondent cit~·
court, a viola tor who is cited for the second time within
a year may not simply post bond and forfeit the bail I
These persons whether they be young or old mml I
. I
appear before the judge for plea, trial and sentencmg.
Under these circumstances, the violator normally musi
pay a higher fine and attend eight hours of instruction
in the traffic school taught on the campus of the Uni· 1
versity of Utah. It is, therefore, only reasonable tha'. !
in the case of the juvenile drivers who receive a secona
ticket within a prescribed period of time that they be I
referred to the juvenile court for proper counseling

I

I
1
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I

and assistance. This procedure would greatly help
the juvenile court in carrying out its duty of reiiabilitating delinquent minors. Instead of receiving
agreat mass of violators for automatic processing, the
court would only receive those who were irresponsible
or showing anti-social behavior thus allowing the personnel of the court to spend considerable time and effort
in helping these individuals.
CONCLUSION
The Legislature intended that traffic violations
committed by persons under 18 be handled by the juvenile court and by other courts of competent jurisdiction. The distinction is made between such offense and
all other alleged violations because the Legislature
"otherwise provided by law."

Traffic violations are the only offenses which upon
adjudication shall be d~emed the conviction of a crime
: ISec. 55-10-105 ( 2) ) by a minor. No other viola tion
li1 the juvenile court retains that stigma.
The trial court was well advised when he made the
following ruling in his memorandum decision:
"Section 105 ( 4) is, in my opinion, another
statement relating to exclusive jurisdiction of
the juvenile court. It is a specific statement that
no child shall be either charged with, or convicted
of, crime in any court except in ( 1) felony cases
certified under Section 86 and ( 2) cases involving traffic violatoins. Had the legislature intended that traffic violations must be handled exclu-

11
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s~vely by the juvenile court _,this second exce~

bon woul~ ~ever. have _been I?cluded in 105(4 1
In my op1mon, mcludmg this exception in 10·
is a clear demonstration that the legislature i11'. I
tended that cases involving traffic violations 01 I
persons under 18 could be brought, and convic·
tions obtained in courts other than the juvenile
court."
I
After a close reading of the entire Juvenile Court I
Act of 1965, one will readily conclude that traffic 01.
fender~ are to be treated in a class by themselves. Tne
Legislature did not intend "exclusive jurisdiction" tn
these cases.
I
f

Because the juvenile court is a special court, iG
jurisdiction must be very strictly construed. If there
be any doubt, then that doubt must be resolved agaimt
"exclusive jurisdiction."
The decision of the trial court was made after care·
ful consideration and is correct. That decision shoula
be upheld by this court.
Respectfully submitted,
HOMER HOLMGREN
City Attorney
PAUL G. GRANT
Assistant City Attorney

I

414 City & County Building

I

Salt Lake City, Utah

i

l

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDAXTS
& RESPONDENTS
I
I
I

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I
I

l

Delivered five (5) copies of respondent's brief to Ronald
N. Boyce, Attorney for appellant, at the offices of Salt Lake
county Bar Legal Services, Inc., 431 South 3rd East, Salt Lake
City, Utah, this 29th day of March, 1968 •
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